iii. The 'Sûreté Générale', the organization responsible for internal security. It had always been in French hands, although in principle the local police and gendarmerie were under the control of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. S L 648 625

iv. The control of the Beduin.

v. The censorship of the press, which was in French hands, although there was also a British military censor. (Shortly after the accession of the new Syrian and Lebanese Governments to power, they set up their own political censorships, which did not, however, replace that of the French, but were additional to it.) S L 648 204

Thirdly, in addition to these legislative and administrative limitations, there were various restrictions even on those powers which the Governments possessed : S L 648

i. Their freedom of action was restricted by the great influence of the administrative and technical 'conseillers', who, although officials of the Governments and in theory subordinate to the Ministers whom they advised, were in practice almost all-powerful in the departments to which they were attached.

ii. Another restriction arose from the existence of the officers of the 'Services Spéciaux' who were scattered throughout the country. In theory they were the Delegate-General's intelligence officers, but in practice they had always exercised a virtually unlimited authority in their regions : an authority which they had enforced where necessary by means of the 'Gardes Mobiles', a semi-military police force which they had at their disposal. Among other things, the control of the frontiers was in their hands.

The nationalists had always demanded the recognition of the two Parliaments as the sole sources of legislation ; the transfer of the Common Interests and other similar services to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments ; the abolition of the 'Services Spéciaux' officers and a curtailment in the powers of the 'conseillers'. It was clear that these demands would be pressed with vigour by the new Nationalist Governments, partly because of the principles involved but also because of concrete advantages to be gained from them. For example, control of the customs would give them power to regulate fiscal policy and thus indirectly to assist industry and trade, and would place in their hands an important source of S L 648 186